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ENFORCEMENT OF FAIR-TRADE LAWS IN
NON-FAIR-TRADE JURISDICTIONS
The legal structure of resale price maintenance is fundamentally an authorization to violate antitrust laws running from the federal government
through the states to manufacturers who wish to establish a retail price
level for their products. Congress first gave to the states the privilege of
passing laws which, without congressional approval, would have been contrary to the Sherman Act if applied to interstate commerce.' Then state
legislatures gave to manufacturers the privilege of entering into contracts
with wholesalers and retailers which without state approval would have
been violative of state antitrust laws. 2 In addition, the states have given
to any injured party the right to enforce fair-trade prices against anyone
who knowingly violates the established price even though the violator may
3
not have signed a fair-trade agreement.
Under the protective mantle of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the
Sherman Act 4 forty-five states passed fair-trade laws.5 After the Supreme
Court had held that it was constitutional to enforce a fair-trade contract
against a nonsigner, 6 there seemed little that could legally shake fair trade.
However, in 1951 the Supreme Court discovered by carefully reading the
Miller-Tydings Amendment that only the interstate enforcement of contracts and agreements between signers was authorized, and accordingly enforcement against a nonsigner across state lines was contrary to the Sherman
Act and unlawful. 7 Shortly before this decision the Third Circuit had uncovered another flaw in the federal law.8 A mail-order house in Pennsylvania
had been selling Sunbeam electric shavers at less than fair-trade prices
throughout the country. The court was willing to grant an injunction against
sales in Pennsylvania but declined to extend that relief to the other states
on the theory that to do so would create an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
To fill these two gaps, Congress in 1952 enacted the McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 It specifically provided that
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
2092 (1890), 15 U.S.CA. § 1 (1951).
Consult 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 3075.

(1911). 26

Stat.

' Consult ibid., at 3250.
'50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.CA. § 1 (1951).
5
The exceptions are Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of
'Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
Consult Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 175
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
'Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903, modified on rehearing,
3d, 1951).
- 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp., 1953).

Columbia.
U.S. 183 (1936).
(1954).
192 F. 2d 7 (CA.
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enforcement of fair-trade prices against nonsigners engaged in interstate
commerce would not violate the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act and further provided that:
Neither the making of contracts or agreements ...nor the exercise or enforcement of any right or right of action ...shall constitute an unlawful burden or
restraint upon, or interference with, commerce. 10
To circumvent this provisiori and the state fair-trade laws, a mail-order
house might be established in a non-fair-trade jurisdiction to send goods
at less than fair-trade prices into fair-trade states. 1 This comment will explore some of the problems which would face a manufacturer who wishes
to enforce fair-trade laws against such a mail-order house.
The manufacturer's major obstacle is that he must enter the non-fairtrade jurisdiction and persuade a court there to apply a foreign fair-trade
law. The general rule with respect to torts is that "the law of the place
of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury,"'12 and,
"if a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of
action will be recognized in other states."' 3 The manufacturer must first,
therefore, convince the court that a tort has been committed within a fairtrade jurisdiction.
The state fair-trade laws make "advertising, offering for sale, or selling' 14 commodities at less than fair-trade prices unfair competition. Of the
-three, it would be easiest to prove that advertising had occurred inside the
fair-trade jurisdiction. Probably an extensive mail-order business would be
impossible without the use of some form of interstate advertising. An injunction against advertising goods at less than fair-trade prices in fair-trade
jurisdictions might, therefore, be sufficient to block successful operation of
the mail-order house.
It would be more difficult to show that an offering for sale had occurred
in the foreign jurisdiction. The word offer suggests the law of contracts; a
mail-order house could probably avoid making contractual offers outside its
own jurisdiction. A statement that all orders were subject to acceptance
at the home office would probably suffice to convert any solicitations into
20 Ibid.
"This was suggested by the activities of one Masters Corp., described in: Wall Street
journal, p. 1, col. 6 (September 23, 1954); General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307
N.Y. 229, 120 N.E. 2d 802 (1954); and General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order
Co., 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. N.Y., 1954). As yet Masters has not directly presented the
problem to be considered here because, although operating a store in the District of
Columbia, a non-fair-trade jurisdiction, they have maintained an office in New York
City and were first incorporated in Maryland, both fair-trade jurisdictions.
'Rest.,

Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934).

-Ibid., at §384(1).
"4Consult 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 3075.
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advertising, making the customer's order the offer and the shipment the
acceptance. 15 The use of the word offer, however, in these statutes does not
compel the use of contract analysis; the phrase could be construed to mean
any type of solicitation. But if the state legislatures intended the word
offer to have such a broad meaning, they need not have included the category of advertising in the list of actionable violations.
Like offering for sale, selling immediately suggests the terminology of the
law of sales and more particularly the concept of passage of title. By careful legal planning the mail-order house could probably arrange the transaction so that title would pass when the goods were delivered to the carrier
inside the non-fair-trade jurisdiction. 1 6 Use of the passage-of-title concept
to determine the location of the sale seems an undue restriction on "selling"
in this context. It could be plausibly argued that the evil to be prevented
by fair-trade laws is that of giving purchasers an opportunity to get fairtraded items at less than the fair-trade price. If the purchaser is the
significant party, it would seem to follow that anyone providing an opportunity to buy at less than fair-trade prices would be guilty of unfair
competition in the jurisdiction of the purchaser.
Even if the manufacturer persuades the court that a tort has been
committed inside a fair-trade jurisdiction, the court still may refuse to apply
the law of that state to the transaction. No precedents applying the rule
that the law of the place of wrong governs foreign fair-trade violations have
been found; good analogies are scarce because of the peculiar nature of this
statutory tort. First, the tort is of a multiple character-the activities of the
mail-order house presumably give rise to a cause of action in every fair-trade
jurisdiction in which it advertises or into which its goods are shipped. In
this respect it is similar to defamation, which in theory can create a
separate cause of action in each jurisdiction in which the defamatory statement is published. 17 The remedy, however, distinguishes the two torts: for
defamation the cure is damages; for unfair competition the usual remedy
is an injunction. The only other tort which may be analogous is the common-law tort of unfair competition, which typically is passing off goods
under the name of another producer.' 8 The common-law tort of unfair
competition, like its statutory cousin, is potentially multiple in that a cause
'I Corbin, Contracts § 88 (1950).
"'See General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 122 F. Supp. 797 (1954).
'For a discussion of the multiple-tort problem with emphasis on defamation, consult
Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447 (1953), and The
Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: an Unsolved Problem, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1947). See note 27 infra.
'For a discussion of the conflict-of-laws problems associated with unfair competition,
consult The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A Legal-Industrial
Enigma, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947), and cases collected in 148 A.L.R. 139 (1944).
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of action is created in every jurisdiction in which the goods are sold; in
addition, injunctive relief is common to both.
As a practical matter the action against the hypothetical mail-order
house will probably be brought in the federal courts. 19 Therefore, the closest
conflict-of-laws analogy available will be a common-law action to restrain
unfair competition in interstate trade brought in the federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. What law has been applied to such an
action? In the pre-Erie v. Tompkins 20 era it was the federal common law
of unfair competition, but since 1938 the federal courts have been bound
to apply the law of the state in which they sit if there is no federal question involved in the litigation.21 Three years later, the decision in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.22 extended the Erie doctrine to
compel the federal courts to follow the local conflict-of-laws rules. Since
most of the states have adopted the rule that the place of wrong should
determine the substantive law, 23 in most interstate unfair-competition cases
the federal court has reiterated the rule that the law to be applied is that
of the place of wrong.
A case which illustrates this procedure is Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v.
Lefco.2 4 The Adam Hat Company, a New York corporation, brought an
action in the federal district court in Pennsylvania to restrain the defendant
from selling clothes with the label, "Adams Clothes." The plaintiff's goods
were sold nationally, but the defendant's operations were restricted to three
stores, one each in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. The federal court
first recited the rule that the substantive law of the forum state should be
applied to torts committed there and found that by Pennsylvania law the
defendant's conduct was not actionable. Then, following the conflict-of-laws
rule of Pennsylvania-that the place of wrong should determine the substantive law to be applied to foreign torts-the court found that neither
the law of New Jersey nor of Delaware made tortious the conduct of the
"0 It would be to the advantage of the manufacturer to bring the action in the federal
court even if he could bring it in the state courts because the federal courts are probably less sensitive to the "public policy" of the states in which they sit; also, the manufacturer could argue on appeal that the federal courts should not be bound by the local
public policy. See p. 536 infra. Conceivably the action could be brought in the Supreme
Court by a fair-trade state against the mail-order house-a citizen of another state-in
which case the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction under U.S. Const. Art.
III, § 2. There would be problems presented by this maneuver. See, generally, Missouri
v. Illinois & the Sanitary District of Chicago, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) ; Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
'°Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' Consult The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A Legal-Industrial
Enigma, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947).
-313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'Beale, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1935).
-

134 F. 2d 101 (CA. 3d, 1943).

1955]

COMMENTS

defendant in those states. 25 When presented with the interstate unfair-competition problem the federal courts have generally indicated a willingness
26
to apply more than one law.

Some courts, however, have recognized the difficulties involved in enforcing the law of the place of wrong in a multiple tort case.27 One court
has observed that:
The application of the lex loci delecti is simple enough if there is a single situs
of the tort against which redress is sought; but it becomes complex if not impossible when, as here, there are a multitude of states where the alleged tort is
committed with conceivably conflicting laws. And one need hardly point out the
probable injustice and confusion which would arise from the determination according to domestic law of a single state adroitly selected as the locus fori of issues
resulting from tortious acts no one of which occurred in that state in an action
whose object is injunctive relief ultimately on a nation wide pattern, and with
immediate impact only in states far remote from the one whose internal law is
28
urged as controlling.
Another court has suggested that if the state court, rather than the federal
court sitting in that state, were faced with the problem of applying the law of
' It is worth noting that what actually happened was that the court could not find
any case in point in any of the three states. Believing that if the state courts had been
faced with the same problem they would have followed the "general law," the court
searched for a case in point and found it in a Massachusetts decision.
' Consult generally, The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A LegalIndustrial Enigma, 60 Ilarv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947). Probably because of the dearth of
state unfair-competition cases in pre-Erie days, no case has been found in which a
federal court has actually used more than one law in an unfair-competition case. Thus
the courts have held that the law of the place of wrong was substantially the general
law in: Gum v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F. 2d 957 (C.A. 3d, 1943); SoconyVacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F. 2d 632 (C.A. 6th, 1940); Zephyr American Corp. v.
Bates Manufacturing Co., 59 F. Supp. 573 (D.C. NJ., 1945), on remand from 128 F.
2d 380 (C.A. 3d, 1942); Skinner Manufacturing Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., Inc.,
52 F. Supp. 432 (D. Neb., 1943). One court has suggested that if a party wants a
foreign unfair-competition law applied, he has the duty to show that it is different from
the law of the forum. Federal Glass Co. v. Federal Glass Co., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 692
(D. Del., 1952). Some courts have simply applied the local law without much consideration of whether other law might not apply. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v.
American Expansion Bolt & Manufacturing Co., 124 F. 2d 706 (C.A. 7th, 1942); Ballard
& Ballard Co. v. Borden Co., 107 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Ky., 1952); Independent Nail and
Pack Co. v. Stronghold Screw Products, 107 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ill., 1952), rev'd on
other grounds, 205 F. 2d 921 (C.A. 7th, 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953) ; Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass.,
1942).
' In the interstate libel situation the "single publication" rule has been developed which
would give but one cause of action which would be determined apparently by the law
of the state from which distribution takes place. Hartmann v. Time, 166 F. 2d 127
(C.A. 3d, 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948). Consult authorities cited note 17
supra. The development of a similar rule is complicated in the unfair-competition situation
because injunctive relief is involved.
' Skinner Manufacturing Co. v. General Foods Sales, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 432, 439-40
(D. Neb., 1943), aff'd 143 F. 2d 895 (C.A. 8th, 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 766 (1944).
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its forty-seven sister states, the state court would rebel and apply only its
own law; accordingly, the federal court can do the same thing and apply only
29
the law of the forum.
Rarely has a federal court recognized that it was faced with a conflict between the law of the forum and the law of the place of wrong concerning unfair competition. In Purcell v. Summers3" it was suggested to the court that no
relief should be granted because the law of the forum would not support a
cause of action for unfair competition, although the other states in which the
defendant was engaged in the same conduct would grant the plaintiff relief.
This is precisely the situation in which a manufacturer attempting to enforce
foreign fair-trade laws in a non-fair-trade jurisdiction is placed. In the Purcell
case the court disagreed with the suggested interpretation of the law of the
forum (South Carolina) but in passing observed that:
Even if we were of the opinion that the decision in the state court established a
rule of unfair competition at variance with the rule stated above . . . it would
not follow that the plaintiff would not be entitled to an injunction, but merely that
the injunction should be so drawn as not to apply to activities of the defendant's
limited to the State of South Carolina. . . . It would be intolerable . .. [if] the
determination of the controversy . . . should depend upon the rule prevailing in
one of the states, simply because a suit with relation thereto happened to be tried
there. And this would be particularly unfortunate if the rule prevailing in such
state was at variance with the rule prevailing in the others. Unfair competition is
a tort governed by the law of the state where it occurs. If it occurs in a number
of states it must be dealt with according to their laws; and injunction against
conduct constituting unfair competition in a number of states may not be denied
merely because under the law of another state it is not recognized as unfair.31
This accumulation of dicta suggests that the law to be applied by a court in
the non-fair-trade jurisdiction is the foreign fair-trade law of the place of
wrong. But the rule which would apply the law of the place of wrong is subject
to an elusive exception: if the foreign law is contrary to the public policy of
'The state courts would have "the robust common sense to avoid writing opinions
and entering decrees adapted with academic nicety to the vagaries of forty-eight states.
And until Massachusetts adopts a checker-board jurisprudence, the Klaxon case does
not require this court to do so." National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co.,
47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass., 1942), aff'd 140 F. 2d 618 (C.A. 1st, 1944). This
result could be avoided if the fair-trade action were brought by a wholesaler whose
activities were limited to a single fair-trade jurisdiction, rather than by the manufacturer
whose interests extend into every state. This could be done since the statutory tort of
unfair competition gives a cause of action to anyone injured by violation of the price

policy.
- 145 F. 2d 979 (C.A. 4th, 1944).
'Ibid., at 989. When Judge Parker referred to the rule that "a tort is governed by
the law of the state where it occurs," he was presumably applying the conflicts rule of
the state of the forum. A case involving exactly the opposite situation-one jurisdiction
which would grant relief with many, including the forum, that would not-led to the
contrary result: R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (CA. 2d, 1940).
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the forum, it will not be enforced.3 2 Federal courts, bound to follow the law of
the state in which they sit, should not hear a foreign cause of action if the
public policy of the forum state is contrary to the foreign law. Thus the Supreme Court has said:
Rights acquired by contract outside a state are enforced within a state, certainly
where its own citizens are concerned; but that principle excepts claimed rights so
33
contrary to the law of the forum as to subvert the forum's view of public policy.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws and most of the commentators have
adopted the view that a foreign cause of action should be barred only when
enforcing the right would violate a strong public policy of the forum.3 4 The
leading case in support of this view is Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,35 in which
Judge Cardozo said:
If aid is to be withheld here, it must be because the cause of action offends our
sense of justice or menaces the public welfare .... Our own scheme of legislation
may be different. We may even have no legislation on the subject. That is not
enough to show that public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign right.... We
are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because
we deal with it otherwise at home.... The courts are not free to refuse to enforce
a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.3 6
While this narrow view of the limitation of public policy has not been explicitly
rejected, it has not fared altogether well in the courts. The difficulty lies basically in measuring public policy. Lacking any other means of discovering the
public policy of a state, the courts have turned to the state statutes and decisions. Having done this, they have found it a practical impossibility to distinguish between those statutes and court opinions which express a strong
public policy and those whose basic motivation is less powerful. 37
An examination of the federal cases reveals that their primary guide to public
policy is the state legislature. If there is a statute which will not allow the action
in the state court, the federal court sitting in that state will decline to hear the
'Rest., Conflict of Laws § 612 (1934).
v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 (1941).
"Rest., Conflict of Laws § 612, Comment c (1934); Beale, Conflict of Laws § 612.1

' Griffin

(1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 11 (1935). Compare Nussbaum, Public Policy and
the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 Yale L. J. 1027 (1940).
6224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).

-Ibid., at

110-11, 201-2.

'But see Crouch, J., minority opinion in Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 475, 3 N.E.
2d 597, 600 (1936), where he expressed the opinion that there could be no great difference
in public policy between the states.
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case because it would be contrary to the public policy of the forum. 8 On the
other hand, when the two jurisdictions have statutes which are substantially
similar or attempt to achieve the same end, the federal court will usually hear
the action even though there is a conflict between the specific provisions. 39 It is
also true that absence of a statute in the forum state similar to the one which
40
is the basis for the foreign cause of action will not necessarily bar the plaintiff.
Where a manufacturer is seeking to enforce a fair-trade law in a non-fairtrade jurisdiction, there may be state antitrust statutes which declare a public
policy contrary to such an action. Of the three states which have not passed
fair-trade laws, two-Missouri 4' and Texas 4 2-- have antitrust laws which
would make fair-trade contracts void as contrary to public policy. If an
action based on such a contract were brought in a Missouri or Texas court,
it might refuse to enforce the foreign cause of action. Unless the federal
court is prepared to abandon the standard which has been used thus far in
determining public policy, it would probably rule that a manufacturer could
not enter those states and seek to restrain price-cutting.
The same result could occur in the states which have found the nonsigner
' Thus when a Mississippi citizen brought a libel action in Georgia against a Georgia
newspaper, the federal court refused to hear the case because a Georgia statute provided that no libel action could be brought without giving the publisher notice and an
opportunity to retract. Tademy v. Scott, 157 F. 2d 826 (C.A. Sth, 1946). Similarly,
foreign causes of action for breach of promise to marry have been denied by federal
courts sitting in Massachusetts [Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass., 1944)],
New York [O'Connor v. Johnson, 74 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. N.Y., 1947) 1, and Pennsylvania
[A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa., 1940)], because statutes in those states had
abolished the cause of action. An Illinois real estate man was unable to collect in a
federal court located in Wisconsin his commission for a sale of Wisconsin land, even
though the contract was made in Illinois, because Wisconsin had a statute requiring
real estate agents to register before they could sue for their commissions. Reed v. Kelly,
177 F. 2d 473 (C.A. 7th, 1949). An action to enjoin a former employee, a Michigan
citizen, from seeking employment with a competitor of the plaintiff was denied by a
federal court in Michigan despite the fact that the contract was made in Illinois, because a Michigan statute made such contracts void. May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596
(W.D. Mich., 1939). Cf. Matthews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. 2d 73
(C.A. 6th, 1943). Actions on contracts which Missouri and New York statutes would
make champertous were denied by federal courts sitting in those states though the contracts were presumably valid in the states in which they were made. Jamison Coal and
Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F. 2d 889, 895 (C.A. 8th, 1944); Transbel Investment Co. v.
Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. N.Y., 1940),

'Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Reddin, 128 F. 2d 787 (C.A. 8th, 1942); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pan American Airways, 57 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. N.Y., 1944).
But cf. Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
"oJames-Dickinson Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
'Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) § 416.020.
'Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. (1951) Art. 7426, 7429, 7437. The same is true of the District
of Columbia, since Congress has not passed a fair-trade law there and, accordingly, the
antitrust laws apply. However, the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Amendment would probably be sufficient to convince a D.C. court that the District had no
strong public policy against fair-trade laws.
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provision in the fair-trade laws violative of their state constitutions. 43 In a
sense this would seem to represent a higher form of public policy than a mere
anti-monopoly act, but if the Florida experience is at all typical,4 4 the constitutionality of these fair-trade laws represents a continuing battle between
the legislature and the courts. It might be suggested that since "half" of
the state's public policy is in favor of fair trade, the public policy of the
forum has not been finally expressed as against resale price maintenance.
The mere allegation of a sharp difference between the statutes of the
forum and the foreign state would not necessarily be enough to convince the
court that the foreign law ought not to be enforced; the mail-order house
would also have to establish that the non-fair-trade state's policy would be

adversely affected by applying the foreign law. This question goes directly
to the policy behind the statute which is urged as barring the foreign cause
of action.45 Thus when a federal court sitting in New York declined to hear
" Arkansas: a lower court has held the Fair Trade Act unconstitutional. Union Carbide
and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 1954 CCH Trade Cases 67,781
(Ark. Chan. Ct., 1954). Florida: see note 44 infra. Michigan: Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. 2d 268 (1952). Minnesota:
the Attorney General has expressed the belief that the Fair Trade Law is valid, Opinion
of the Attorney General of Minnesota, 1952 CCH Trade Cases 167,391, on the theory
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Sachs, 234
Minn. 303, 48 N.W. 531 (1951), was based on the Schwegmann case which had been
overruled by the McGuire Amendment. Nebraska: General Electric Co. v. J. L. Brandeis
and Sons, 1954 CCH Trade Cases 67,682. (Dist. Ct., Neb., 1954).
"The Florida situation is that at the moment fair trade is unenforceable. The fight
between the legislature and the court started in 1937 when the legislature first passed
a fair-trade statute. The court struck it down as unconstitutional because the title to
the act was misleading. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508,
188 So. 91 (1939). The legislature repaired this defect, but the same act was again held
unconstitutional, this time because the nonsigner clause was an unwarranted exercise
of the police power, considering the economic situation, and it was an unreasonable
restriction on the right to own and dispose of property. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental
Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (1949). In 1949 the legislature added to the act what it
termed "Findings of Fact" which in effect said that fair trade would serve the public interest and general welfare, and prevent monopoly, and that the statute was a lawful exercise
of the police power. But the Florida Supreme Court declined to follow these findings of
fact, and again held the act unconsitutional, Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene,
Inc., 54 So. 2d 235 (1951), partially on the grounds of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). After the
passage of the McGuire Amendment the legislature finally won a round in the courts
on the theory that the Seagram case rested on the Schwegmann decision which had been
overruled by the McGuire Amendment. Sunbeam Corp. v. Chase & Sherman, Inc., 1953
CCH Trade Cases 67,524 (C.C. Fla., 1953). However, the Florida Supreme Court refused to follow that construction of its previous decision and again held the act unconstitutional as an unwarranted exercise of the police power in Miles Laboratories Inc.
v. Ekherd, 73 So. 2d 680 (1954).

"The necessity of establishing that the public policy of the forum is involved in a
case before it can be urged as a bar to a foreign cause of action can be seen in the
language of the Supreme Court in cases which came before the Court in the thirties.
The Court found the interests of the forum state unaffected in Home Life Insurance
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), in which Brandeis, J., said, "Dick urges . . . that a
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a foreign breach-of-promise action because the New York legislature had
abolished, the cause of action, it was justified in so doing because the policy
of that statute was to protect the state's courts from being used as tools of
extortion.46 Such a policy would be subverted by hearing either a local or
a foreign cause of action.
In this case, the statute which declares the public policy of the non-fairtrade state is an antitrust statute. If the policy behind that law is considered
as solely for the benefit of consumers, it would be difficult to spell out an
interest which the non-fair-trade state has that would justify excluding the
foreign fair-trade action. The relief which the manufacturer would seek
would relate only to foreign consumers. The people of the non-fair-trade state
would still be able to buy fair-traded items at prices independently determined by their local merchants. If, however, the policy of antitrust legislation
is broader and encompasses the sweep of free-enterprise thinking, it is conceivable that the non-fair-trade state's policy would be adversely affected
by enforcing the foreign fair-trade law. The point to be emphasized would
state may properly refuse to recognize foreign rights which violate ... its laws or public
policy.... We need not consider how far the state . .. may go in refusing to lend the
aid of its courts to the enforcement of rights acquired outside its borders. It may not
abrogate the rights of parties . . . having no relation to anything done or to be done
within them." Ibid., at 410. Later Brandeis spoke for the Court in Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), coming to the same conclusion in these
words: "[T]here is no adequate basis for the lower court's conclusion that to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public policy of New Hampshire. No decision . . .
has been cited indicating that recognition of the Vermont statute would be regarded
in New Hampshire as prejudicial to the interests of its citizens.... Nor does sufficient
reason appear why it should be so regarded. The interest of New Hampshire was only
casual. Leon Clapper was not a resident there. He was not continuously employed there.
So far as appears he had no dependent there. It is difficult to see how the State's interest would be subverted, under such circumstances, by burdening its courts with this
litigation." Ibid., at 161-62. The Court came to the opposite conclusion and allowed a
state court to decline to recognize a foreign statute in Alaska Packers Association v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), in which Justice Stone said that
the forum state "had a legitimate public interest in controlling and regulating this employer-employee relationship in such fashion as to impose a liability upon the employer
for an injury suffered by the employee, and in providing a remedy available to him in
California." Ibid., at 542-43. "[T]here are some limitations upon the extent to which a
state will be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment
of another state, in contravention of its own statutes or policy ....
[Ilt is unavoidable
that this Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may
qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another." Ibid., at 546-47. "The
conflict is to be resolved . . . by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight." Ibid., at 547. "Without a remedy in California, they would be remediless, and there was the danger that
they might become public charges, both matters of grave concern to the State." Ibid.,
at 542. Accord: Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306
U.S. 493 (1939).
'*O'Connor v. Johnson, 74 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. N.Y., 1947). Accord: Tademy v.
Scott, 157 F. 2d 826 (C.A. 5th, 1946); Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass.,
1944).
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be that the mail-order house is incorporated and doing all of its business
within the non-fair-trade state. Thus it could be argued that the policy of
antitrust acts is not only to provide consumers with the benefits of active
competition, but also to provide an unconscious control over the privately
owned business structure of the state through price competition. To compel
the local mail-order house to obey foreign fair-trade price lists would alter
the internal business structure of the state. While in essence the mail-order
house is an export firm, this would not distinguish it because many businesses
within the non-fair-trade state would be engaged in interstate commerce.
Under this conception of the policy of state antitrust laws, the non-fair-trade
state has a legitimate interest in seeing that businesses within the state are
not discouraged by the imposition of a foreign law contrary to the competitive
norm established by the antitrust law.
If a federal court should decline to enforce the foreign cause of action
because the public policy of the state in which it sits is contrary to the theory
of resale price maintenance, the Supreme Court will be confronted with a
difficult problem. States' rights would appear on both sides of the argument.
The mail-order house could argue with force that each state ought to be
allowed to determine its own public policy, unaffected by the policy of its
sister states. On the other side the manufacturer could argue that the public
policy of one state ought not to be allowed to undermine the legislative policies of forty-five other states.
The Supreme Court could justify the enforcement of a foreign fair-trade
law in a non-fair-trade state in at least two ways, both of which seem improbable. The Court could (1) expand the concept of full faith and credit
to require that all states apply foreign law to foreign wrongs regardless of
the public policy of the forum, or (2) overrule the Griffin v. McCoach47
precedent and hold that federal courts are not bound by the public policy
of the state in which they sit.
The scope of the full faith and credit clause in the Constitution is possibly the most uncertain area in constitutional law today.48 The Court has
recently indicated that there are some limitations on what state legislatures
can do in barring foreign causes of action. In Hughes v. Fetter49 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute providing that no actions
could be brought in that state's courts under foreign wrongful-death statutes.
The action was between Wisconsin citizens, but the accident occurred in
Illinois. Following the legislature's instructions, the Wisconsin court had
held that the public policy of the state prevented its hearing the action. The
Supreme Court, split five to four, appeared to hold that despite the legisla'7313 U.S. 498 (1941).

Consult Cheatham, Federal Control of Conffict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 581 (1953).
"341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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ture's words there was no strong public policy in Wisconsin against entertaining actions under the Illinois wrongful-death act. This may be another
application of the rule requiring that the state must have a reasonable interest in the case before it can justifiably bar a foreign cause of action on
the ground of public policy. 50 In any event, the difference of views within
the Court apparently centered around the question of whether Wisconsin's
policy was strong enough to bar the action. All of the justices agreed that
full faith and credit did not always compel the state court to apply a foreign
law.
The key point in the fair-trade situation is the argument that the policy
of the antitrust law of the non-fair-trade state would be subverted by enforcement of the foreign fair-trade law; once the Court accepts that argument, it will probably have to put foreign statutes in the same class as
foreign judgments in order to reach the result that the non-fair-trade state
would have to enforce the foreign fair-trade law.51 In view of the strong
dicta in all the opinions in Hughes v. Fetter52 that situations could arise
where a state might properly bar a foreign cause of action because of its
public policy, it seems most unlikely that the Court would be willing to
spell out such a constitutional obligation to enforce foreign statutes from the
full faith and credit clause.
Short of this the Court might still require the non-fair-trade jurisdiction
to enforce the fair-trade law of another state by following the suggestion
of the late justice Jackson in his specially concurring opinion in First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 a case similar in its
facts to Hughes v. Fetter.54 Both cases concerned substantially the same
provision of a wrongful-death statute, but in the Air Lines case the action
was brought in a federal court rather than a state court. The defendant contended that the federal court could not hear the case because: (1) the forum
state's statute prohibited actions brought for foreign deaths, and (2) this
prohibition also applied to a federal court sitting in that state.55 The majority
of the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute as violative of full
faith and credit, but Justice Jackson suggested that,
Since as a matter of constitutional provision liability for this alleged tort must
be adjudged under Utah law and the case being within the statutory jurisdiction of
the District Court, it may ascertain and apply the law of Utah without straining it
through the Illinois sieve.55
' See cases cited note 45 supra.
' This was advocated by Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: the Defense of
Public Policy, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1952). Consult also Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States 542-57 (1953).
-341 U.S. 609 (1951).
-341 U.S. 609 (1951).
-342 U.S. 396 (1962).
'Angel v. Bulington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
'First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 401 (1952).
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In other words, the federal courts would not be bound to follow the public
policy of the states in which they sit. This would in part represent a retreat
from the reasoning of Erie v. Tompkins; conceivably the accident of
diversity of citizenship might provide one litigant with relief in a federal
court which would be denied another in a neighboring state court though
the facts were identical. On the other hand, the chances of a frequent difference in result appear slight.57 Jackson's suggestion would at least temporarily provide relief from polarity of result-it would preserve to the
states the power to determine their own public policies, and at the same time
affirm the policy that at least in the federal courts relief will be provided
no matter where the action is brought or where the wrong occurred.
It seems more likely that the Court would decide the action brought by
the foreign manufacturer along traditional public-policy lines with the result
that the manufacturer could not obtain injunctive relief against the mailorder house (assuming, of course, that the Court accepted the suggested
theory that the forum state has a justification for asserting its non-fair-trade
public policy)58 This would be a difficult result to reach on the facts. The
mail-order house was probably created with the single object of avoiding
state laws and gaining an economic advantage thereby. If the Court approves

such dubious conduct, it might destroy fair trade. The possibility of the end
of fair trade is suggested by the few cases in which the courts in fair-trade
jurisdictions have exercised equitable discretion and declined to give a manufacturer an injunction against a clear violation of the fair-trade agreement
because the violator was merely meeting the competition presented by other
violators.59 Thus far the courts have been fairly strict in this matter, allowing
the violator to escape only when there was strong evidence of bad faith on
the part of the manufacturer or where it seemed evident that the manufacturer had waived his right to a fair-trade price policy. 60 It is impossible
to predict how long the chancellor's discretion could hold out against the
argument that the foreign mail-order house is destroying the price policy
and that therefore violators inside the fair-trade jurisdiction should be free
' But it would happen occasionally. See, for an example, Doggrell v. Great Southern
Box Co., Inc. of Miss., 206 F. 2d 671 (CA. 6th, 1953), and Paper Products Co. v.

Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W. 2d 127 (1953).

'See page 534 supra.
"Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.
2d 320 (S. Ct., 1938); General Electric Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103
N.Y.S. 2d 440 (S. Ct., 1951), and authorities cited therein. Consult also 1 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. f 3448, 3440, 3452; and 163 A.L.R. 889 (1946).
'This defense is basically the equitable doctrine of clean hands. To apply it where
the manufacturer was unable to prevent the price-cutting, suggested in the text as a
possibility, would expand the conception of the "meeting competition" defense far
beyond its present scope to include situations where the enforcer was in no sense at
fault.
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to set their own prices. The Supreme Court would have to consider the
possibility that courts in fair-trade jurisdictions might refuse to enforce their
own laws because of the mail-order house's activities.
Before the Court arrives at a consideration of these last problems, it will
have to be persuaded that a tort has been committed in a fair-trade jurisdiction; that the public policy of the non-fair-trade state is against fair-trade
actions; and that enforcing the foreign fair-trade laws will in some sense
subvert that public policy. Should the Court decide that the public policy
of the forum bars the manufacturer's fair-trade action, the result will not
be surprising. Congress has full power to legislate with regard to interstate
commerce, but with fair trade it has chosen to abdicate that power to the
states. It is not particularly shocking that the full faith and credit clause
will not do what the commerce clause can do.

DAMAGES FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH
OF CHILDREN
The death of a child is the greatest of all losses-impossible of compensation-and yet at the same time an economic saving to the family involved.
This situation poses a perplexing problem for our tort law by placing a great
strain on the avowed principle that damages should be strictly compensatory
in nature. Significant changes in the economic and social environment since
the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 have made more acute the
question whether substantial damages should be awarded for the wrongful
death of a child.1 It is the purpose of this comment to indicate the difficulties
involved in existing legal doctrines in the child death area, the economic
factors affecting the "value" of the child to the family, and, finally, possible
alternatives to present methods of compensation.
I
At common law there was no action for wrongful death. 2 For various reasons this result was thought to be unsatisfactory; 8 consequently, statutes were
'The number of persons affected by this area of the law is indicated by the fact
that 12,300 persons under twenty-four years of age died in 1952 in motor vehicle accidents alone where, in all probability, a large portion of the deaths would be actionable.
National Safety Council, Accident Facts 59 (1953 ed.). In 1950, 22,453 persons under
twenty-four years of age died from accidents of all types. Ibid., at 91. See also
Dublin, Health Progress 1936 to 1945, at 95 et seq. (1948).
2In "a civil court, the death of a human could not be complained of as an injury."
Baker v. Bolton, 2 Rolle's Abridgement 575, placita 2 and 3 (1808). For a discussion of
the common-law doctrine and early American cases, see Tiffany, Death by Wrongful
Act §§ 1-3, 11 (2d ed., 1913); Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at
Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 201, 203 et seq. (1932).
'The main reason was the inequity of allowing recovery where plaintiff is almost
killed but allowing no civil action where the wrongdoer commits the supposedly more
serious offense of causing death.

